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* This paper uses EUROMOD version C7. EUROMOD is continually being improved and updated and the 
results  presented  here  represent  the  best  available  at  the  time  of  writing.  Any  remaining  errors,  results 
produced, interpretations or views presented are the authors’ responsibility. EUROMOD relies on micro data 
from twelve different sources for fifteen countries. This  paper uses data from the  Austrian  version of the 
European  Community  Household  Panel  (ECHP)  made  available  by  the  Interdisciplinary  Centre  for 
Comparative Research in the Social Sciences and the Austrian version of the EU SILC made available by 
Statistik  Austria as  well as  for an international comparison the ECHP User Data Base  made available by 
Eurostat; the Panel Survey on Belgian Households (PSBH) made available by the University of Liège and the 
University of Antwerp; the Income Distribution Survey made available by Statistics Finland; the Enquête sur 
les Budgets Familiaux (EBF) made available by INSEE; the public use version of the German Socio Economic 
Panel Study (GSOEP)  made available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin; the 
Living  in  Ireland  Survey  made  available  by  the  Economic  and  Social  Research  Institute;  the  Survey  of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW95) made available by the Bank of Italy; the Socio Economic Panel for 
Luxembourg (PSELL 2) made available by CEPS/INSTEAD; the Socio Economic Panel Survey (SEP) made 
available  by  Statistics  Netherlands  through  the  mediation  of  the  Netherlands  Organisation  for  Scientific 
Research   Scientific Statistical Agency; the Income Distribution Survey made available by Statistics Sweden; 
and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), made available by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
through the Data Archive. Material from the FES is Crown Copyright and is used by permission. Neither the 
ONS nor the Data Archive bears any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data reported here. 
An equivalent disclaimer applies for all other data sources and their respective providers. 
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The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether policy reforms in Austria between 1998 and 2005 were 
successful in meeting redistributive objectives and in reducing poverty. For the analysis we use the 
tax/benefit micro simulation model EUROMOD. Due to the sequence of reforms and the use of 
two datasets, the period under review is split into two parts: 1998 to 2003 and 2003 to 2005. 
Important changes in the first period were the tax reform 2000, the introduction of the universal 
childcare benefit (“Kinderbetreuungsgeld”) as well as increases in family targeted benefits and tax 
reliefs. We find that the policy reforms were in general clearly progressive and family friendly. 
However, as with elderly people, the situation did not improve for all population groups at risk of 
poverty. In the period from 2003 to 2005 the tax reform 2004/05 was introduced and contributions 
to health insurance were raised. We find that the measures had no significant impact on poverty 
and income distribution; however, in total they  increased the disposable income for almost all 
population groups. The analysis is completed by the assessment of the redistributive impact of two 
hypothetical policy changes in favour of lower income groups, namely the continuous introduction 
of  employees’  social  security  contributions  above  the  lower  threshold  for  contributions 
(“Geringfügigkeitsgrenze”) and the yearly indexation of family benefits. 
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1  Introduction 
The Austrian welfare system does not primarily focus on persons at risk of poverty. As the Austrian 
National Action Plan for Social Inclusion states, particularly “family policy is based on the principle of 
horizontal compensation, with state benefits being redistributed away from persons without dependent 
children to those who have childcare obligations” (Republic of Austria 2001, 18). However, the same 
source points out that “in Austria there is a general consensus that combating poverty and social 
exclusion are central matters of political concern for society” (Republic of Austria 2003, 3). Thus, 
it  can be  argued  that  in  Austria poverty  is  combated  in  a  “preventive”  way by  including  the  whole 
population – and not only the socially disadvantaged – in the system of the welfare state. In fact, the 
redistributive  impact  of  taxes  and  benefits  from  high  to  low  income  classes  reaches  a  considerable 
amount. 
 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether tax/benefit policy reforms between 1998 and 2005 were 
successful  in  reducing  poverty  and  in  meeting  redistributive  objectives  (concerning  the  reduction  of 
inequality of disposable income with respect to differences in primary income and family composition). 
In addition we investigate the effect of two hypothetical policy changes in favour of low income groups, 
which were designed following recent political discussions but also on the basis of the results of the first 
part of our analysis. Questions addressed are: 
 
   Who benefited and who lost from changes in taxes and benefits? 
   In particular, did particularly vulnerable groups such as children, or the elderly gain from these 
reforms? 
   What have been the effects on people living in different household types (e.g. households with and 
without children, single parents, etc.)? 
   What  were  the  consequences  of  the  policy  changes  in  terms  of  social  security  contributions, 
income taxes and cash benefits paid/received by each income quintile? 
   How did the redistributive impact of these instruments change over time? 
 
To investigate these questions we use the tax/benefit micro simulation model EUROMOD. A tax/benefit 
model is based on representative household micro data and designed to analyse the effects of changes to 
components of disposable household incomes, particularly social security contributions, personal taxes 
and cash benefits. Austria is one of the few countries that hardly uses tax/benefit micro simulation for 
national policy analysis and debate. Usually tax/benefit changes are evaluated by using administrative 
data, which refer only to individuals, or by analysing the effects on “typical” model families. However,   7 
the household context is crucial when analysing distributional effects, and measuring the effects on model 
families is a limited approach as they represent only a certain part of the whole population. In contrast, 
tax/benefit  micro simulation  models  are  able  to  analyse  the  effects  of  policy  changes  and  of  their 
interactions with already existing policies on all population groups both on the individual and on the 
household level. 
 
The period under review is analysed in two parts: first we evaluate tax/benefit reforms from 1998 to 2003 
and thereafter tax/benefit reforms from 2003 to 2005. The main reason for doing so is the sequence of the 
main reforms (increase of family benefits from 1999 to 2003; tax reform 2004/05 and increase of social 
insurance contributions 2004 and 2005) that can be fully represented in this way. Furthermore we use two 
datasets  for  the  analysis:  the  5
th  wave  of  the  ECHP  (European  Community  Household  Panel,  PDB 
version) with income data for 1998 and the EU SILC 2004 (Community Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions) with income data for 2003.
2 The special approach we apply allows measuring the “pure 
policy effect” of the reforms by using the ECHP for the period from 1998 to 2003 and the SILC for the 
period from 2003 to 2005 as well as for the simulation of hypothetical policy changes. This approach is 
described in more detail in Chapter 2.2. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: Chapter 2 describes methodological issues like the capabilities of 
EUROMOD  and  tax/benefit  micro simulation  models  in  general  and  explains  the  approach  and 
definitions we apply throughout this study. Chapter 3 provides a short overview of Austria’s position in 
Europe concerning the structure of taxes and benefits and the situation concerning social inclusion and 
income distribution. Chapter 4 describes the policy reforms from 1998 to 2003 and evaluates their impact 
on poverty and income distribution. Chapter 5 analogously analyses policy reforms from 2003 to 2005. 
Chapter 6 assesses the effect of hypothetical policy reforms in favour of lower income groups. Finally, 
Chapter 7 summarises and concludes our findings. 
                                                 
2 The ECHP (European Community Household Panel) was conducted in Austria from 1995 to 2001. In 2003 it was replaced by 
the EU SILC (Survey on Income and Living Conditions) as basis for statistics on income and the social situation of private 
households in Europe. The ECHP data is provided by the Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social 
Sciences (IFS/ICCR), Vienna (see Interdisziplinäres Forschungszentrum Sozialwissenschaften 2001). The sample comprises of 
7,386 individuals in 2,677 households. For calculating gross values from the net income data, specific approaches for different 
income  components  were  followed.  The  SILC  data  is  provided  by  Statistik  Austria  (see  Statistik  Austria  2006a  and 
http://www.statistik.at/fachbereich_03/eusilc_txt.shtml).  The  sample  comprises  of  11,524  individuals  in  4,521  households 
(children  born  in  2004  were  excluded).  Both  datasets  contain  comprehensive  information  on  socio demographic 
characteristics, labour market characteristics and income  and living conditions of Austrian households.   8 
2  Methodological issues 
2.1  Tax/benefit micro-simulation and EUROMOD 
The tax/benefit micro simulation model EUROMOD is a flexible tool, which enables research on the 
effects  of  policy  reforms  that  have  an  impact  on  incomes,  poverty,  inequality  and  social  inclusion.
2 
Particularly important for our purposes is that it allows the analysis of policy changes on a very high level 
of detail and coherence. With EUROMOD it is possible to analyse single components of the tax/benefit 
system  in breakdowns,  which  are  hardly  available  from  other  sources  (i.e. benefits broken  down by 
income, age, gender and household type). 
 
Micro simulation models are based on household micro data from representative sources. Disposable 
income is calculated for each household in the dataset by using elements of income taken from the survey 
data (e.g. original income from employment) combined with components that are simulated by the model 
(taxes and benefits). The calculations are performed once for a basic scenario – in our case the tax/benefit 
system as it was in place in 1998 respectively 2003 – and again for one or more policy change(s). These 
policy changes can be in the form of possible reforms policy makers or researchers might be interested in 
as well as in the form of real changes from one year to another – in our case the tax/benefit changes 
between 1998 and 2003 respectively 2003 and 2005. 
 
The basic output from EUROMOD is the micro level change in household disposable income as a result 
of changes in taxes and/or benefits. This provides a basis for the calculation of 
   impacts on measures of poverty and inequality 
   differential effects on groups of socio economic interest, classified by individual or household 
characteristics 
   estimates of aggregate effects on state revenue and expenditure 
 
The areas of policies covered by EUROMOD include social security contributions (both of employees 
and employers
3), income tax
4 as well as cash benefits. Not covered are for example indirect taxes (e.g. 
                                                 
2 For a detailed description of EUROMOD see Sutherland 2001; for a discussion of the applicability of indicators of social 
inclusion in EUROMOD see Atkinson 2002. 
3 As social security contributions by employers do not affect disposable income, they are not included in this paper. 
4  EUROMOD  covers  also  some  form  of  property  taxes,  for  Austria  withholding  tax  on  investment  income 
(“Kapitalertragssteuer”). However, this kind of taxes is usually heavily underestimated in tax/benefit models since capital and 
interest income are underreported in the underlying income surveys.   9 
value added tax) and benefits in kind (e.g. free access to health and education services). Furthermore, the 
underlying micro data usually not include information on social insurance contribution histories. Thus it 
is not possible to fully simulate social benefits that are contributory (pensions
5, unemployment benefits, 
sickness benefit, maternity benefit, etc.); therefore they are taken directly from the data. On the other 
hand, simulated benefits are fully simulated, meaning that a possible non take up of eligible persons is 
not taken into account (this is especially the case for social assistance). Thus measures of poverty and 
inequality  in  the  income  contribution  indicate  usually  lower  values  than  in  the  underlying  original 
datasets. 
 
2.2  Measuring the “pure” impact of policy changes 
A common approach for analysing the effect of reforms of the tax/benefit system is using income data for 
successive  years. However, a change observed by this method reflects not only the impact of policy 
reforms but also the impact of other influences such as changes in the level of economic activity, changes 
in demographic composition or changes in the distribution of sources of primary income.
6 It is difficult or 
impossible to decompose the observed change into the parts that are due to each influence, not least 
because they are not independent of each other. Static micro simulation models, such as EUROMOD, 
however allow an approach that holds most influences constant and enables us to focus on the “pure” 
effect of reforms of the tax/benefit system (day after effect). In other words we ask what would have 
happened if nothing but policy rules had changed. This is achieved by comparing outcomes of applying 
1998 tax/benefit rules and 2003 tax/benefit rules on the same micro data (for 1998) to analyse the policy 
reforms from 1998 to 2003. By doing so we measure the “first order” or “over night” effects of moving 
from the 1998 to the 2003 tax/benefit system, abstracting from effects of demographic, macro economic 
and behavioural changes (cf. Sutherland 2002). The same approach is used to analyse the policy reforms 
from 2003 to 2005, using micro data for 2003. Appendix 2 illustrates the advantage of this approach 
compared to an analysis of policy changes in the time period 1998 to 2003 based on micro data for 1998 
and 2003. 
 
2.3  Concepts and definitions 
Throughout this study we use equivalised incomes, taxes and benefits. That means that we sum up, for 
example, disposable income of all household members and then assign a proportion of this sum to each 
                                                 
5 In our case, only the pension top up is simulated. 
6 See Immervoll et al. 2006 for an assessment of these influences.   10 
household member. The proportion is computed by dividing the household sum by a factor that accounts 
for economies of scale, i.e. the fact that larger households are better off than smaller by sharing certain 
resources (e.g. heating).
7 As an exception to this rule, in Figure 1 unequivalised income, and in Tables 8, 
9, 15 and 16 unequivalised taxes and benefits are used for obvious reasons. 
 
Income deciles are defined by proportioning the population into ten groups according to their equivalised 
disposable household income. Poverty is assessed using poverty rates that indicate the share of persons 
with equivalised disposable income below the poverty line. The poverty line is defined as 60% of median 
equivalised disposable income. As we aim to measure the “over night” effect of policy changes based on 
the situation in 1998 respectively in 2003, i.e. their effect if nothing else had changed, we “retain” the 
poverty line and do not recalculate it after simulating the reforms. Thus, also the “sense of (relative) 
poverty” remains the same. With this measure, more substantially decreasing poverty rates are to be 
expected since higher incomes do not affect the poverty line. 
 
For applying the 2003 policy rules on the 1998 data, monetary values are uprated using the consumer 
price index to account for inflation. Thereafter, for the purpose of comparison, all results are adjusted to 
1998 prices. The same approach is applied for 2005 policy rules used with 2003 data. 
 
For the household type, we define children according to the eligibility criteria of the family allowance 
(“Familienbeihilfe”), i.e. persons below 18 or below 26 in full time education and not exceeding a certain 
income limit. 
 
Depending  on  the  perspective,  pensions  can  be  classified  as  benefits  or  original  income.  We  regard 
pensions  as  “state  forced  savings”  and  count  them  –  with  the  exception  of  the  pension  top up 
(“Ausgleichszulage”) – as part of the original income and not as benefits.
8 On the other hand we regard 
the child tax credit (“Kinderabsetzbetrag”) as a benefit as it is granted as a transfer (negative tax paid 
together with the family benefit) independent of the tax liability and with no influence on it. 
 
                                                 
7 We use the modified OECD equivalence scale as divisor, which gives a weight of 1 to the first adult in the household, a 
weight of 0.5 to each further adult and a weight of 0.3 to each child (below 14 years of age). 
8 As the only exception for the international comparison in Figure 1, pensions are counted as benefits (for technical reasons).   11 
3  Austria in an European context 
Though  this  section  is  not  intended  to  be  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  Austria’s  position  in  Europe 
concerning the structure of taxes and benefits and the situation with regard to social inclusion and income 
distribution – as this would go beyond the scope of this study – it provides a general picture by looking at 
important and frequently used indicators. 
 
3.1  Size and structure of taxes and benefits 
3.1.1  Macroeconomic perspective 
The size of the public sector in terms of revenues and social expenditures is comparatively large in 
Austria.  On  the  revenue  side,  in  1998  the  level  of  taxation  (including  social  security  contributions) 
amounted to 43.9% of GDP. After reaching a peak in 2001, it decreased to 42.9% in 2003 and, mainly 
due to the tax reform 2004/05, to 41.9% in 2005 but is still above the OECD Europe and the EU 15 
averages. However, the composition of public revenues implies a rather low degree of progression: The 
share of progressive taxes on income and profits plus taxes on property amounts only to 31%. On OECD 
Europe and EU 15 average the share is considerably higher (37 to 38%) (OECD 2006). 
 
Also the level of social expenditure with regard to GDP is to some extent above EU average in Austria. In 
1998 it amounted to 28.4% of GDP and increased mainly due to the extension of family benefits by 1.1 
percentage points to 29.5% in 2003. The higher social expenditure in comparison to other European 
countries can basically be explained by the high expenditure in the categories “old age and survivors” as 
well as “family” (European Commission/Eurostat 2006). 
 
Table 1: Size of public sector revenues and social expenditures in % of GDP
9 
  1998  2003 
  Revenues  Social Expenditure  Revenues  Social Expenditure 
Austria  43.9  28.4  42.9  29.5 
OECD Europe  38.6    38.3   
EU-15  40.3  27.5  39.7  28.3 
(EU-25: 28.0) 
Source: European Commission/ Eurostat 2006; OECD 2006 
 
                                                 
9 For 2005, no data is available on the European level so far.   12 
Focusing in more detail on the instruments analysed in this paper – i.e. social security contributions, 
income taxes and cash benefits – with regard to social security contributions we find a relatively stable 
rate on a high level of more than 14% of GDP in Austria, which is still clearly above the OECD Europe 
and  EU 15  averages.  The  upper  contribution  limit  leads  to  a  regressive  impact  of  social  security 
contributions, as in relation to income it puts a heavier burden on low income groups than on higher 
income groups. On the other hand, the size of revenues from (progressive) taxes on income and profits is 
more close to the OECD Europe and EU 15 averages, but tends to be below these. The latest tax reform 
reduced the share in the GDP to 12.0% in 2005 (OECD 2006). 
 
The predominant part of total social expenditure consists of monetary transfers, in Austria around 72%, in 
the European Union around 68%. Again in Austria the rate of cash benefits in % of GDP is higher than on 
EU average and amounted after the extension of family benefits in 1999/2000 to more than 20% in 2003 
(European  Commission/  Eurostat  2006).  So  far,  no  corresponding  data  for  2005  are  available  but 
monetary transfers derived from the system of national accounts indicate a decrease by 0.5 percentage 
points in 2005 (BMSG 2006; Statistik Austria 2006b). 
 
Table 2: Social security contributions, income and profit taxes, cash benefits in % of GDP
10 


























Austria  15.1  12.9  19.8  14.5  12.7  20.5  14.4  12.0  n/a 
OECD Europe  11.2  13.4    11.1  12.6    n/a  n/a   




n/a  n/a  n/a 
Source: European Commission/ Eurostat 2006; OECD 2001; OECD 2006 
 
The expenditure side of the Austrian welfare state is characterised by the principle of horizontal equity 
(e.g.  redistribution  from  households  without  children  to  households  with  children  independently  of 
income, etc.). Thus, like in the EU 25, only a small share of cash benefits goes to means tested benefits; 
in Austria the share (4%) is even smaller than on EU average (8%) (European Commission/ Eurostat 
2006). In Austria the cash benefits are dominated by benefits within the social insurance system which are 
related to past income levels: Including pensions (and the equivalent “Ruhegenüsse” of civil servants), the 
share reaches 70% of all cash benefits. The 2
nd largest type are universal benefits (mainly family related) 
with a share of 15%. 
 
                                                 
10 For 2005, no data is available on the European level so far.   13 
In 2003, almost two thirds of the cash benefits account for old age and survivor benefits, 13% for family 
transfers, 10% for invalidity benefits, 6% for unemployment benefits, 5% for cash benefits related to 
sickness and 1% for other transfers. Since 1998 the highest increase is registered for family benefits 
(BMSG 2006). 
3.1.2  Microeconomic perspective 
EUROMOD covers all  countries of the EU 15  Member States.  It embodies a knowledge base  about 
different national structures and policy systems within a comparative framework. We use this capacity to 
analyse the micro economic effects of social security contributions, income taxes and cash benefits in an 
European context and compare the composition of standardised € 100 disposable income in 1998.
13 
 
Figure 1 shows the results for an average household and for low  and high income households. For seven 
countries (Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom) market income constitutes 
on average between 95% and 105% of disposable income, meaning that in these countries the state “takes 
away” about the same amount in taxes and employee contributions as it “provides” in cash benefits. In 
Austria, the share of cash benefits (incl. pensions) slightly outweighs social security contributions and 
income  taxes.  On  the  contrary,  on  EU 15  average,  market  income  is  slightly  higher  than  disposable 
income, emphasising – like in Austria – slightly more the role of income taxes than that of social security 
contributions. 
 
For households in the bottom decile, market incomes and state transfers each account for approximately 
50%  of  disposable  income  in  six  EU 15 countries  (Austria,  France,  Greece,  Luxembourg,  Spain  and 
Sweden). This is also the case for the EU 15 average. For Austria it can be seen that people in the lowest 
income decile pay only social security contributions but almost no taxes, whereas on the EU 15 average 
there is an almost equal share of the two instruments. 
 
Looking at households in the top decile, in practically all countries the share of income taxes to be paid is 
higher than the share of social security contributions. This relates to upper contribution limits for social 
security contributions and to progressive income tax scales. An interesting pattern is that the share of 
benefits is considerably higher in Austria compared to the other countries. Partly this can be explained by 
the  fact  that  income  is  more  equally  distributed  than  in  other  EU countries  (see  Chapter  3.2). 
Nevertheless, it also mirrors the importance of social insurance related and universal benefits in Austria. 
Moreover,  in  Austria  public  pensions  –  especially  of  civil  servants  –  form  a  considerable  part  of 
                                                 
13 Note that in the scope of the model major parts of taxes (e.g. indirect taxes) and benefits (e.g. benefits in kind, public 
services) are not included. Public pensions are classified as benefits here.   14 
disposable income in the top decile, while in other countries public pensions are of less importance for the 
top decile. 
Figure 1: Composition of € 100 disposable income in Austria and other EU countries, 1998 
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Income components based on unequivalised household disposable income 
Pensions classified as benefits 
Source: Euromod 
3.2  Poverty rates and inequality of income distribution 
According  to  European  convention  60%  of  the  median  equivalised  income  constitute  the  at risk of 
poverty threshold, i.e. for Austria 10,182 Euro for a single person household per year in 2003 (1998: 
8,628).
11 About 13% of persons in Austria were living in households with an equivalised income below 
the threshold (1998 12%). In an European comparison this at risk of poverty rate is relatively low and 3 
to  4 percentage points  below  the  EU 25  and  EU 15 averages.  Both  in  Austria  and  on  the  European 
average, at risk of poverty rates are higher for women than for men. 
 
Table 3 shows also at risk of poverty rates for children (in this case defined as persons aged younger than 
16) and elderly people (aged 65 or older) in contrast to the rates for the whole population. In Austria, both 
                                                 
11 In this paper the year relates to the year the incomes refer to. As Eurostat defines the year after the year the data was 
gathered (= income year+1), the listed figures can be found under the years 2004 (incomes 2003) and 1999 (incomes 1998) at 
the Eurostat website.   15 
children and in particular elderly people face a higher at risk of poverty rate than the total population. 
Concerning child poverty, Austria ranks consistently lower than on EU average whereas regarding old 
age poverty Austria found itself clearly above EU average in 1998 but slightly below it in 2003 (Eurostat 
New Cronos). 
Table 3: Poverty rates in Austria and in the EU, 1998 and 2003 
   1998  2003 
  total  men  women  <16  >64  total  men  women  <16  >64 
Austria  12  10  14  14  24  13  11  14  15  17 
EU-25  16  15  17  19  17  16  15  17  20  18 
EU-15  16  15  17  19  17  17  15  18  20  19 
NMS-10  nd  nd  nd  nd  nd  16  16  16  22  9 
Poverty rate: share of people living in households with disposable income below the poverty line 
Poverty line: 60% of median equivalised disposable household income 
Source: Eurostat New Cronos 
 
Not only overall poverty rates are lower, also the disposable equivalised income of the households is 
more  equally  distributed  in  Austria  than  on  the  European  average.  The  Gini coefficient  shows  the 
percentage of the income concentration and amounts to 26% in Austria. On EU average it amounts to 
about 30%. 
Table 4: Gini-coefficients in Austria and in the EU, 1998 and 2003 
   1998  2003 
Austria  0.26  0.26 
EU-25  0.29  0.30 
EU-15  0.29  0.30 
NMS-10  nd  0.30 
Based on equivalised disposable household income 
Source: Eurostat New Cronos 
Summarizing it can be concluded that the size of social security contributions and income and profit taxes 
on the one hand, and cash benefits on the other hand, is relatively large in Austria. This means that on 
average the state withdraws a relatively high share of market incomes in form of contributions and taxes 
but also provides a relatively high share of cash benefits to private households. In contrast to the other 
European countries (basically regressive) social insurance contributions play a more important role than 
(progressive) taxes on income and profits. Both at risk of poverty rates and the inequality of income 
distribution (measured in equivalised disposable income) are below the EU average.   16 
4  Changes in tax/benefit policies 1998 – 2003 
In this chapter we first describe the most important policy changes implemented between July 1998 and 
June 2003 in Austria covered by the analysis. Thereafter, the main part of this chapter refers to the 
distributional consequences of the implemented policy reforms.
12 
 
4.1  Description of changes taken into account in the analysis 
4.1.1  Social security contributions 
From  1998  to  2003  there  were  no  changes  in  the  social  security  contributions  for  employees  and 
pensioners: employees had to pay between 17.65% (white collar) and 18.2% (blue collar) of their gross 
income  for  pension  insurance,  health  insurance  and  unemployment  insurance  as  well  as  for  housing 
promotion  (“Wohnbauförderung”)  and  the  compulsory  contributions  to  the  legal  representation  of 
interests  (“Arbeiterkammerumlage”).  Pensioners  paid  health  insurance  contributions  of  3.75%.  All 
contributions had to be paid up to the upper contribution limit. 
 
Self employed, farmers and civil servants have their own contribution rates. For these groups, we list only 
the changes between 1998 and 2003: 
   2001: Increase of pension insurance rate for farmers from 14% to 14.5%; 
   2001: Increase of pension insurance rate for self employed from 14.5% to 15%; decrease of health 
insurance rate for self employed from 9.1% to 8.9%; 
   2001:  Differentiation  of  the pension  contribution  for  federal  civil  servants:  for  those born before 
December  1959  12.55%,  for  those  born  after  November  1959  11.05%  (before  for  both  groups 
11.75%); 
   2001: Increase of the pension contribution for federal civil servant pensioners from 1.3% or 1.5% 
(depending on the date of retirement) to 2.1% or 2.3% (HV SV various volumes). 
 
For  self employed  and  farmers  the  consequences  have  been  a  slight  increase  in  social  security 
contributions. For federal civil servants the changes have a kind of redistributive effect, as contributions 
were lowered for younger persons (with lower incomes) and increased for elder persons (with higher 
incomes). 
                                                 
12 To make clear the scope of the model, in Appendix 3 we also list those kinds of changes which are not covered by the 
analysis with EUROMOD.   17 
4.1.2  Income tax 
In Austria the tax system is not indexed, changes to parameters occur only in the framework of tax 
reforms. Reforms of the income tax scale become essential, amongst others, if due to inflation incomes 
grow nominally and underlie increasing tax rates.
13 Thus, the tax reform 2000 (though essentially not 
increasing the bracket boundaries) reduced the middle three marginal rates by one percentage point each. 
Furthermore it introduced a tax free zone into the scale. Beside this tax free zone, after the change the tax 
scale comprised of four brackets with marginal tax rates from 21% to 50% (see Table 5).
14 In addition, 
the general tax credit (“Allgemeiner Absetzbetrag”) was increased from € 642 to € 887 per year with 
different tapering rules in order to decrease the tax credit with increasing income as before (Breuss/Weber 
1999; Lehner 1999). 
 
Table 5: Income tax: tax rates and bands 
up to 1999  since 2000 
tax bands  rate  tax bands  rate 
for the first € 3,634  10 % for the first € 3,640  0% 
for further € 7,267 (up to € 10,901)  22 % for further € 3,630 (up to € 7,270)  21% 
for further € 10,901 (up to € 21,802)  32 % for further € 14,530 (up to € 21,800)  31% 
for further € 29,069 (up to € 50,871)  42 % for further € 29,070 (up to € 50,870)  41% 
for all further amounts  50 % for all further amounts  50% 
Income liable to tax: gross income minus social security contributions 
Source: EStG § 33 
 
In addition, in the period under investigation the following changes concerning tax credits took place: 
   1999: Increase of negative tax (paid directly in cash in cases of no or little tax liability) relating to the 
single parent  tax  credit  (“Alleinerzieherabsetzbetrag”)  and  the  single earner  tax  credit 
(“Alleinverdienerabsetzbetrag”) for persons with at least one child from € 145 to € 364 per year. 
   2001: Reduction of the wage earner tax credit (“Arbeitnehmerabsetzbetrag) from € 109 to € 54 per 
year. 
   2001: Tapering of the pensioners’ tax credit (“Pensionistenabsetzbetrag”) between € 16,715 and € 
21,802 annual income. 
 
The outcomes of the tax reform 2000 on the individual level can be summarised as follows: The effective 
marginal tax rates were reduced for all income recipients; thus, all persons liable to tax were relieved. 
Compared to 1997 (last change of scale) the adaptation eliminates the higher tax burden due to inflation 
                                                 
13 See Immervoll 2005 for a discussion of this subject. 
14 However, as before a special flat rate of 6% applied to the 13th and 14th salary of employees and lowered the marginal tax 
rates.   18 
for all income recipients. The relative gains (related to taxable income) are higher in lower income groups 
and decrease with increasing income. However, in absolute terms tax savings are low in the lower income 
groups (Breuss/Weber 1999; Lehner 1999). 
 
While  the  increase  in  the  negative  tax  related  to  the  single earner/  single parent  tax  credit  is  also 
especially in favour of single parents threatened by a high risk of poverty, the reduction of the wage 
earner tax credit (in relation to the income more important for persons with low incomes) and the tapering 
of the pensioners’ tax credit (starting at a relatively low income) seem to put a burden also on relatively 
low income groups. 
 
4.1.3  Cash benefits 
Pensions 
In Austria there is no universal minimum pension. Only persons eligible to a pension receive the pension 
top up if their total income remains below a certain income threshold. The cumulated increase of the 
pension top up between 1998 and 2003 (10.8% for single persons) was slightly above the increase of the 
consumer price index (cumulated 9.0%) and higher than for average pensions. In 2003, an extra ordinary 
increase of the pension top up for couples by 7.3% took place (cf. HV SV 2006, 89). 
 
Although poorer pensioners were favoured by the measures, not much more than the price stability of 
their pensions was secured. Thus, compared to the development of the incomes of the total population, the 
development of pensions lagged behind. 
 
Family related benefits 
In an international comparison, families are well supported by the tax  and benefit system in Austria. This 
is especially due to the high expenditure on family allowance, child tax credit and the childcare benefit, 
which amounted to 88% of all family cash benefits in 2003 (BMSG 2006; OECD 2005; Statistik Austria 
2006c, 212). 
 
On the basis of a decision by the Constitutional Court on the consideration of children for the taxation of 
income in October 1997, an extensive “family package” with additional transfers was concluded. The 
new measures, which came into effect in two steps in 1999 and 2000, provided an increase in the family 
allowance and in the child tax credit. Concerning family allowance, the base amounts were increased and 
a  surcharge  for  the  second,  third  and  every  further  child  was  introduced.  The  child  tax  credit  was 
increased for the first child (from € 25.4 per month) and the second child (from € 38.2 per month) to 
uniformly € 50.9 per child. These measures enabled to exempt at least half of the maintenance costs for   19 
children from tax (AK diverse volumes; Breuss/Weber 1999; Lehner 1998). In 2003, for children above 
two  years  of  age  the base  amount  of  the  family  allowance  was  increased  again.  Table  6  shows  the 
amounts of family allowance in 1998 and 2003: 
 
Table 6: Family allowance per month 1998 and 2003 
1
st child  2
nd child  3
rd and every further child  Age 
1998  2003  1998  2003  1998  2003 
0 2  94.47  105.40  +0.00  +12.80  +0.00  +25.50 
3 9  94.47  112.70  +0.00  +12.80  +0.00  +25.50 
10 18  112.64  130.90  +0.00  +12.80  +0.00  +25.50 
19 25
15  134.44  152.70  +0.00  +12.80  +0.00  +25.50 
Source: AK diverse volumes 
 
In 1999, a surcharge to the family allowance (“Mehrkindzuschlag”) for families with more than two 
children staying below a certain income limit was introduced, the amount was increased in 2000 and in 
2002; since 2002 for the third and every further child € 36.40 per month are granted if the yearly taxable 
income of the family does not exceed 12 times the monthly upper contribution limit in the social security 
system (in 2003: € 39,240). 
 
Essentially, family allowances and child tax credits are distributed across the income groups similar to the 
distribution  of  the  number  of  children  across  the  income  groups.  The  support per  child  is  relatively 
uniform, but per household due to the higher number of children per family in low income groups, it is 
higher than in high income groups (Guger 1998).
16 Thus, the lower the income, the higher the relative 
advantage rendered by the new family measures. In general, the relative advantages decreased with age 
and number of children. However, this picture is adjusted for low income recipients by the surcharge to 
the family allowance for families with more than two children, which has a strong redistributive impact 
(Guger 2005; Lehner 1998). 
 
In  2002  the  universal  childcare  benefit  was  introduced  and  replaced  the  former  insurance related 
allowance on parental leave (“Karenzgeld”). The main differences are: 
   Almost all mothers/fathers are eligible, originally only those who worked before; 
   a small increase in the benefit amount: € 14.53 instead of € 13.67 daily; 
   the personal income limit for the eligibility to the benefit was increased: in the case of the child 
care benefit recipients are allowed to have an additional yearly gross income of € 14,600; in the 
                                                 
15 If in full time education and below a certain income limit. 
16 Ranked by the net disposable equivalised household income, in households of non self employed the share of children in the 
bottom income third is 40%, in the middle third 33% and in the top third 27% (Guger ÖIF).   20 
case of the allowance on parental leave € 296.21 per month. In both cases the income of the (non 
benefit receiving) spouse is irrelevant; 
   increase of the duration of the receipt by 12 months (to max. 30 months or 36 months in the case 
of the involvement of both partners) (AK diverse volumes). 
 
The introduction of the childcare benefit extended the group of eligible persons, especially towards non 
active  persons  (housewives/househusbands,  students,  pupils).
17  Thus,  women  with  small  children  are 
more frequently in a financially secured status (Riesenfelder et al. 2006). Like the former allowance on 
parental  leave,  the  childcare  benefit  rather  benefits  younger  parents.  It  is  therefore  concentrated  on 
middle  and low income groups and benefits low income groups to an even higher share than the former 
allowance on parental leave (Guger 1998; Guger 2005). 
 
4.2  Empirical findings 
4.2.1  Situation in 1998 
Table 7 shows the dimension of different population breakdowns (by household type, age and gender) 
and  these  groups’  average  equivalised  disposable  household  income  per  month  in  1998.  Persons  in 
households consisting of couples with three or more children and of single parents represent the poorest 
population groups under consideration (incomes of about 80% of the total average). The group with the 
highest  income  are  persons  in  non single  households  without  children  (about  115%  of  total  average 
income). 
 
A noteworthy finding is that children (below 18 years of age) have a considerably lower income than the 
population average. The same is true for elderly people (60 years or older), though to a lesser extent. 
Furthermore, on average women dispose of less income than men. 
 
If we analyse the equivalised disposable household income per decile, we find that the total average is 
exceeded in the 7
th decile. While there is a certain gap in the incomes between the lowest decile (44% of 
total average income) and decile 2 (60% of total average income), there is a tremendous jump from the 9
th 
decile (139% of total average income) to the highest decile (200% of total average income). 
                                                 
17 For modelling reasons we assume a full implementation of the childcare benefit already in 2003. In reality this is only the 
case by the end of 2004. The difference is small since it concerns only those persons who were not eligible to the former 
allowance on parental leave, who began to receive the benefit only in 2002. For the other groups, regulations for the transition 
period were obtained which equalled a full implementation.   21 
 






% of total 
average 
all  100.0%  1,366  100.0% 
decile 1  10.0%  603  44.2% 
decile 2  10.0%  821  60.1% 
decile 3  10.0%  958  70.2% 
decile 4  10.0%  1,070  78.4% 
decile 5  10.0%  1,179  86.3% 
decile 6  10.0%  1,311  96.0% 
decile 7  10.0%  1,455  106.5% 
decile 8  10.0%  1,632  119.5% 
decile 9  10.0%  1,901  139.2% 
decile 10  10.0%  2,736  200.3% 
hh type*: single  12.8%  1,282  93.9% 
hh type: single parent  3.6%  1,099  80.5% 
hh type: ma no child  34.1%  1,558  114.1% 
hh type: ma 1-2 children  39.7%  1,321  96.7% 
hh type: ma 3+ children  9.8%  1,084  79.4% 
age 0–17  21.3%  1,203  88.1% 
age 18–59  57.6%  1,451  106.2% 
age 60+  21.1%  1,299  95.1% 
female  51.7%  1,316  96.4% 
male  48.3%  1,419  103.9% 
* hh=household; ma=more (than one) adult; share of persons living in such a hh 
Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income 
Source: Euromod based on ECHP 1999 
 
4.2.2  Effects of changes from 1998 to 2003 on disposable income and poverty 
4.2.2.1  Changes in disposable income 
Figure 2 illustrates the average change in household disposable income for different income groups due to 
the policy changes from 1998 to 2003. On average all reforms taken into account result in a 1.1% increase 
of disposable income. The figure also shows that changes are clearly progressive. Relative income gains 
are the higher the lower the decile, only the top deciles face a certain decrease (though the loss is rather 
moderate). 
   22 
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Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 1998 
Source: Euromod based on ECHP 1999 
 
Turning to the change in household disposable income by different household types, also a clear picture 
emerges: While the groups without children face a decrease in their disposable income, the groups with 
children gain (Figure 3). The “big winners” are those with the lowest income in 1998: families with three 
or more children (plus 6%) and single parents (plus 3%), underlining the progressive character of the 
changes as shown before. 


































































ma = more (than one) adult 
Source: Euromod based on ECHP 1999 
 
The effect of increased family benefits is clearly visible in the analysis according to age groups. Children 
(below 18 years of age) gain by far more (plus 3%) than the other age groups. The working age group (18 
to 59 years of age) is also among the winners (plus 1%), certainly not least because they consist partly of 
parents. The only group with a (small) loss in disposable income are elderly people.   23 
 





all 0 - 17 18 - 59 60+
 
Source: Euromod based on ECHP 1999 
 
4.2.2.2  Changes in poverty 
To measure changes in poverty, poverty rates for 1998 and 2003 are calculated based on the same (or a 
“retained”) poverty line, namely 60% of 1998 median disposable income (see Chapter 2.3). Figure 5 
again illustrates the progressive outcomes of the policy reforms by decreasing poverty rates for the whole 
population (9% vs. 11%) and the population breakdowns taken into consideration. The reforms clearly 
succeeded  in  reducing  child  poverty  (9%  vs.  12%).  On  the  other  hand,  while  all  other  age  groups 
experience a substantial decrease in their poverty rate, the decrease for elderly people is insignificant (this 
can be explained by the moderate increases in the pension top up which were only slightly above the 
development of the consumer price index). Moreover, the already considerable difference between the 
overall poverty rate and the poverty rate for the elderly increases. 
 
Concerning gender, the reforms lead to a somewhat higher decrease in poverty rates for women than in 
those for men. This should be due to the fact that women make up for the predominant part of single 
parents. 
   24 













total 0 - 17 18 - 59 60+ female male
1998 2003
 
Poverty rate: share of people living in households with disposable income below the poverty line 
Poverty line: 60% of median equivalised disposable household income in 1998 
Statistical reliability of the estimates is shown using confidence intervals at the 5% level 
Source Euromod based on ECHP 1999 
Figure  6  confirms  the  observations  made  above:  poverty  reduction  concentrates  on  households  with 
children. The poverty rate for couples with three or more children decreased from clearly above the 
overall rate in 1998 (19%) to about 11% in 2003. The rate for couples with one or two children drops 
from an already low level in 1998 even further. The situation improves also for single parents, one of the 
groups most vulnerable to poverty, although their poverty rate (15%) remains quite above the overall 
poverty rate. In contrast there is practically no change in poverty rates for groups without children. This is 
particularly precarious for singles where about one fifth is still at risk of poverty (a large part of this group 
is presumably formed by elderly people). 





















ma = more (than one) adult 
Poverty rate: share of people living in households with disposable income below the poverty line 
Poverty line: 60% of median equivalised disposable household income in 1998 
Statistical reliability of the estimates is shown using confidence intervals at the 5% level 
Source Euromod based on ECHP 1999   25 
4.2.3  Instruments driving changes 
The previous analysis suggests that tax/benefit changes in favour of families with children take a very 
important role among the policy reforms from 1998 to 2003. In this chapter we assess the contribution of 
different  groups  of  instruments  to  overall  changes  in  more  detail.  Thus,  we  split  total  changes  in 
disposable  income  into  changes  related  to  different  instrument  groups,  namely  social  security 
contributions, income taxes and cash benefits. In a next step, we analyse the share of social security 
contributions, income taxes and cash benefits paid/received by each income quintile and the changes over 
time. Finally, we assess the redistributional effect of each of the instrument groups both in 1998 and 
2003. 
 
4.2.3.1  Role of social security contributions, income taxes and cash benefits 
Figure 7 presents the average changes in disposable income per decile (as in Figure 2), different colours 
indicate the composition of these changes. From the point of view of the household, increases in benefits 
as well as decreases in social security contributions and income taxes are presented in the positive area 
(above the 0.0% line); in the same sense decreases in benefits as well as increases in social insurance 
contributions and income taxes are shown in the negative area (below the 0.0% line). 
 
In general, increases in disposable income arise from gains in benefits, with the progressive patterns 
observed  above.  On  the  one  hand,  the  same  absolute  amounts  (family  allowance,  child  tax  credit, 
childcare  benefit)  play  a  significantly  higher  relative  role  related  to  the  total  income  in  low income 
households. On the other hand, although family benefits are mainly universal benefits and thus benefit 
also high income groups, children are more concentrated in the lower income groups. 
 
In contrast, taxes rise on average for all deciles and therefore decrease disposable income, indicating that 
the outcomes of the tax reform 2000 are outweighed by fiscal drag but also by the following reduction of 
tax  credits  (wage earner  tax  credit,  pensioners’  tax  credit).  The  effect  is  more  significant  for  higher 
incomes. The trend of higher tax payments in 2003 compared to 1998 is confirmed on the individual level 
by the share of income taxes in the taxable income, which increased from 1998 to 2003 from 16.7% to 
17.0% (Milz 2001; Statistik Austria 2006d). 
 
Changes in social security contributions are more or less negligible for all income groups. The changes 
are mainly due to changes in the pension contribution rate of civil servants: it decreased for younger 
persons (lower incomes) but increased for older persons (higher incomes). 
   26 
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Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 1998 
Source: Euromod based on ECHP 1999 
 
Figure 8 decomposes the changes in disposable income according to different household types. Again, 
benefits dominate the picture. Even for groups without children, there are small gains in benefits (pension 
top up), but they are outweighed by tax increases. For single parents, tax reliefs (increase of negative tax 
related to the single earner tax credit) have some importance.  






























ma = more (than one) adult 
Source: Euromod based on ECHP 1999 
 
Turning to the decomposition of the change in disposable income according to age groups, the targeting 
of the policy changes on families with children again becomes obvious. But also the elderly (60 years and   27 
over) gained slightly from changes in benefits, either from the (moderate) changes in the pension top up 
or because a part of them lives in households together with children. Figure 9 shows also that the losses 
due to increases in taxes are concentrated within the group of the elderly. Here, beside fiscal drag, the 
outcomes of the tapering of the pensioners’ tax credit can be observed. 






















Source: Euromod based on ECHP 1999 
 
4.2.3.2  Share of instrument per income group 
In  a  next  step  we  analyse  the  share  of  social  security  contributions,  income  taxes  and  cash benefits 
paid/received by each income quintile (again ranked by equivalised disposable household income). An 
instrument that is entirely independent of income would be distributed equally among the income groups, 
i.e.  each  income  quintile  would  receive/pay  20%.  However,  it  has  to  be  kept  in  mind  that  on  the 
contributions’ and taxes’ side the proportions reflect the existing income distribution by definition, as 
social security contributions and income taxes are based with a certain rate on income. 
 
In  fact,  lower  income  quintiles pay  lower proportions  of  total  social  security  contributions  and  total 
income taxes than higher income quintiles. Moreover, low income groups receive higher proportions in 
total cash benefits than high income groups. In 1998, the lowest quintile paid 6% of all social security 
contributions and 2% of all income taxes and received 28% of all cash benefits. On the other side, the 
highest quintile brought up 38% of social security contributions and 56% of income taxes and benefited 
from 12% of all cash transfers (Table 8). Thus, at a first glance two statements can be made: on the one 
hand the upper contribution limit of social security contributions and the progressive scale of income 
taxes lead to the fact that income taxes are much more concentrated in higher income groups than social   28 
security contributions. On the other hand, also cash benefits – despite the high share of social insurance 
related and universal benefits – are more in favour of households with less income. 
 
The interesting aspect lies in the comparison of the proportions for 1998 and 2003 and thus to assess 
whether the reform measures changed the distribution of the instruments across the income groups. The 
distribution of social security contributions and income taxes shows practically no difference, suggesting 
that there was no change in the progressivity of these instruments. For income taxes this indicates that 
similar to an analysis related to the individual level (cf. Milz 2001; Statistik Austria 2006d), the tax 
reform  2000  did  not  change  the  distribution  of  income  taxes  according  to  income  groups  based  on 
disposable household income, too. Because of the minor changes concerning social security contributions 
(only  self employed  and  civil  servants  were  affected),  no  changes  in  their  distribution  were  to  be 
expected. For the benefit side, the figures in Tables 8 and 9 confirm the progressive nature of the reforms, 
as the proportion of benefits received by the higher two quintiles (27.4% in 2003 vs. 28.7% in 1998) 
decreased in favour of the lower three quintiles (72.7% in 2003 vs. 71.2% in 1998). 
 





income taxes cash benefits 
quintile 1  6.4%  2.4%  27.9% 
quintile 2  11.9%  7.4%  24.8% 
quintile 3  18.3%  12.7%  18.5% 
quintile 4  25.4%  21.6%  16.7% 
quintile 5  38.1%  55.9%  12.0% 
total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Quintile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 1998 
Source: Euromod based on ECHP 1999 





taxes  cash benefits 
quintile 1  6.3%  2.4%  28.6% 
quintile 2  11.9%  7.3%  25.2% 
quintile 3  18.2%  12.8%  18.9% 
quintile 4  25.4%  21.7%  16.0% 
quintile 5  38.2%  55.8%  11.4% 
total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Quintile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 1998 
Source: Euromod based on ECHP 1999 
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4.2.3.3  Redistributional effect of social security contributions, income taxes and cash benefits 
Already  the  above  analysis  provided  some  hints  on  the  redistributive  impact  of  the  tax benefit 
instruments. To refine the assessment of these effects, Table 10 and Table 11 contain a range of standard 
measures in order to explore changes in the effects of the instruments on income inequality. 
 
The Reynolds Smolensky Index of Redistribution represents the difference between income inequality 
before applying an instrument and income inequality after applying this instrument
18 – measured by the 
Gini coefficient,  plus  the  so called  “re ranking” index
19.  The  redistributive  effect  indicated  by  the 
Reynolds Smolensky index can be further decomposed into progressivity and “importance”. Progressivity 
terms the “pro poor” nature – if for example taxes or contributions are disproportionately higher on the 
upper  (lower)  part  of  the  income  distribution,  then  it  is  progressive  (regressive).  We  measure 
progressivity  by  the  Kakwani  index,  which  is  positive  for  progressive  instruments  and  negative  for 
regressive instruments. The amount of redistribution an instrument can achieve not only depends on its 
progressivity but also on its importance. The importance is indicated by the rate, i.e. the (average) rate 
that  is  applied  on  the  base  income  for  calculating  the  instrument.  (Appendix  1  provides  a  more 
comprehensive description of the measures used.) 
 
In  general  the  Reynolds Smolensky  index  indicates  that  cash benefits  have  the  highest  redistributive 
impact of the three instruments,
20 with the redistributive impact of social security contributions tending to 
be  regressive  (the  Gini  is  even  higher  after  applying  this  instrument  than  before).  The  higher 
redistributive impact of cash benefits compared to income taxes stems from their progressive effect (the 
Kakwani index for cash benefits is markedly higher than that for income taxes). However, the higher 
(“importance”) rate provides also the income taxes with an efficient power concerning redistribution. 
 
Regarding the effect of the reform measures between 1998 and 2003, as expected, the redistributive 
impact of benefits increased; however, not by increasing progressivity (the Kakwani index shows an 
                                                 
18 There is a certain ambiguity about the question which “pre income” to use for measuring the redistributional effect of an 
instrument. It is for example not 100% clear whether the pre income for benefits is original income or original income minus 
social security contributions and income taxes. We chose the following “tax/benefit sequence”, as in our opinion this mirrors 
best the Austrian tax benefit system: pre income for social security contributions is original income, pre income for income 
taxes is original income minus social security contributions and pre income for cash benefits is original income minus social 
security contributions and income taxes. 
19 The term re ranking is used for the fact that the income ranking of the population in the pre  and post instrument situation 
can be different, which makes the interpretation of the difference between pre  and post Gini more difficult. However, in our 
case the re ranking indices show very small values, therefore effects due to re ranking can be neglected. 
20 However, it has to be kept in mind that for our analysis we assume full take up of benefits, in particular of social assistance. 
Thus, the Gini after cash benefits is lower than in the underlying original dataset.   30 
insignificant decrease) but by a rise in the (“importance”) rate. This seems to be very reasonable given the 
nature  of  the  reforms.  Concerning  social  security  contributions  and  income  taxes,  index  changes  are 
negligible. 
 
Table 10: Redistributional effect of tax/benefit-instruments, 1998 








social security contributions  0.32182  0.32300  0.00042  0.13477  0.00271  0.00160 
std.error  0.00376  0.00401  0.00059  0.00088  0.00378  0.00005 
taxes  0.32300  0.28180  0.04353  0.17282  0.20836  0.00233 
std.error  0.00402  0.00338  0.00090  0.00182  0.00296  0.00007 
benefits  0.28180  0.23451  0.05359  0.09609  0.61129  0.00630 
std.error  0.00322  0.00288  0.00157  0.00216  0.01030  0.00052 
rate: size of instrument in percentage of base 
Source: Euromod based on ECHP 1999 
Table 11: Redistributional effect of tax/benefit-instruments, 2003 








social security contributions  0.32182  0.32270  0.00072  0.13506  0.00461  0.00161 
std.error  0.00388  0.00406  0.00056  0.00093  0.00356  0.00004 
taxes  0.32270  0.28074  0.04446  0.17619  0.20790  0.00250 
std.error  0.00397  0.00334  0.00097  0.00192  0.00308  0.00007 
benefits  0.28074  0.22653  0.06195  0.11348  0.60789  0.00774 
std.error  0.00345  0.00296  0.00180  0.00260  0.01063  0.00051 
rate: size of instrument in percentage of base 
Source: Euromod based on ECHP 1999   31 
5  Changes in tax/benefit policies 2003 – 2005 
The second time period under investigation is the period from July 2003 to June 2005. Below we describe 
the most important policy changes taken into account in the analysis. The main part of this chapter is 




5.1  Description of changes taken into account in the analysis 
5.1.1  Social insurance contributions 
Whereas in 2003 employees were subject to contributions between 17.65% (white collar) and 18.2% 
(blue collar) of gross income for social security, housing promotion and compulsory contributions to the 
legal representation of interests, in 2005 these contributions amounted to between 18.0% (white collar) 
and 18.2% (blue collar). 
 
The increase of the total contribution rate is due to increased contributions to health insurance, which 
affected  also  pensioners  (who  pay  only  contributions  to  health  insurance)  as  well  as  self employed, 
farmers  and  civil  servants,  who  have  their  own  contribution  rates.  The  increase  in  health  insurance 
contributions was due to several reasons: introduction of a contribution for accidents in leisure time, 
establishment of an uniform contribution rate (employer plus employee) for white collar and blue collar 
employees, (temporary) general increase of health insurance contributions, stepwise increase of health 
insurance contributions of pensioners (HV SV 2004; HV SV 2005). Table 12 contains the changes for the 
most important groups: 
 
Table 12: Contributions to health insurance 2003 and 2005
22 






Farmers  Civil Servants  Pensioners 
2003  3.95%  3.40%  8.90%  6.40%  3.95%  3.75% 
2005  3.95%  3.75%  9.10%  7.50%  4.10%  4.95% 
Source: HV SV diverse volumes 
 
                                                 
21 Changes which are excluded due to restrictions of the model are listed in Appendix 3. 
22 Excluding employer contributions.   32 
In general these changes led to a heavier burden for all groups with pensioners being most affected. 
Because of the upper contribution limit the changes tend to have a (small) regressive impact. 
 
With the target of increasing the employment rate of the elderly and prolonging their presence on the 
labour  market,  beside  other  measures  the  contributions  to  the  unemployment  insurance  (employees’ 
contribution: 3.0%) for female employees above 56 years of age and male employees above 58 years of 
age were abolished. The measure benefits elderly employees and thus usually those with higher incomes. 
 
   In the course of the pension reform 2004, the pension contributions of active federal civil servants 
were again differentiated: in 2003 they paid 12.55% (if born before 1960) or 11.05% (if born after 
1959) for incomes below and above the upper contribution limit for social security contributions
23; if 
born after 1954 from 2005 on, depending on their exact age, they pay between 10.25% and 12.4% for 
incomes below the upper contribution limit and between 0.0% and 11.73% for incomes above the 
upper  contribution  limit.  Within  the  group  of  civil  servants,  this  means  a  (slight)  redistribution 
towards younger groups with less income. 
   In 2004 the pension contribution rate for federal civil servant pensioners was raised by one percentage 
point to (depending on the date of retirement) 3.1% or 3.3%. 
 
In 2005, the upper contribution limit for social security contributions was raised extraordinarily by 5.2% 
(BMSG 2006). This puts a somewhat higher burden on higher income groups. 
 
5.1.2  Income tax 
Within the first stage of the tax reform 2004/05 tax credits targeting families were further increased: 
Supplements with regard to the number of children were added to the single earner/ single parent tax 
credit (so far uniformly EUR 364 per year), which are also paid as negative tax (paid directly in cash in 
cases of no or little tax liability): 
   EUR 130 for the 1
st child, 
   EUR 175 for the 2
nd child and 
   EUR 220 for each further child. 
 
In addition, the income limit for the spouse for the single earner tax credit was increased from € 4,400 to 
€ 6,000 per year, if the couple has a least one child. 
 
                                                 
23 Civil servants are the only group of persons who pay pension contributions also above the upper contribution limit.   33 
The 2
nd stage of the tax reform 2004/05 integrated the increased general tax credit into the regular income 
tax schedule. The tax schedule was reduced to four income brackets with three marginal tax rates from 
38.33% to 50%
24, the tax free zone was enlarged (Breuss et al. 2004; BMSG 2004). 
Table 13: Income tax: tax rates and bands 
up to 2004*  since 2005** 
tax bands  rate  tax bands  rate 
for the first € 3,640  0 %  for the first € 10,000  0% 
for further € 3,630 (up to € 7,270)  21 %  for further € 15,000 (up to € 25,000)  38.33% 
for further € 14,530 (up to € 21,800)  31 %  for further € 26,000 (up to € 51,000)  43.60% 
for further € 29,070 (up to € 50,870)  41 %  for all further amounts  50% 
for all further amounts  50 %  -  - 
Income liable to tax: gross income minus social security contributions; * General tax credit not integrated; ** General tax 
credit already integrated 
Source: EStG § 33 
 
The tax reform results in about 350,000 persons in addition who have to pay no income tax due to low 
income; thus, from about 5.9 million persons liable to tax now about 2.55 million are exempted from tax. 
However, as the general negative tax (10% of social security contributions up to € 110 per year) was not 
increased, persons without or with very low income are not relieved by the tax reform. 
 
The highest relative tax savings occur at a yearly income liable to tax of € 11,000 € (6.1%). They are 
reduced with increasing income to 0.7% at € 22,000 and increase up to an income of € 35,000 to 1.6%. 
For higher incomes they drop continuously. In comparison to 2003, up to a yearly income liable to tax of 
€ 50,000 €, the fiscal drag is compensated for all income recipients (Breuss et al. 2004). 
 
The changes concerning the single earner/ single parent tax credit improved also the situation of single 
parents that are exposed to an above average risk of poverty. 
 
5.1.3  Cash benefits 
Pensions 
The cumulated increase of the pension top up between 2003 and 2005 (3.0% for single persons) was 
higher than the increase for average pensions but below the development of the consumer price index 
(cumulated 4.4%). However, in 2004, an extraordinary increase of the pension top up for couples by 
                                                 
24 However, as before a special flat rate of 6% applies to the 13th and 14th salary of employees and lowers the marginal tax 
rates.   34 
5.1%  took  place  (cf.  HV  SV  2006,  89).  Thus,  in  the  period  under  investigation  only  the  financial 
safeguarding of low pensions of couples was secured. 
 
Family related benefits 
In the area of family related benefits only minor changes took place between 2003 and 2005. In general, 
the changes were more in favour of low income groups but were of a small extent: 
   In 2004 the childcare benefit was increased by 50% for multiple births; 
   for the means tested supplement to the childcare benefit (approx. EUR 181 per month) the personal 
income limit was increased from € 3,997 to € 5,200 per year in 2004; 
   hand  in  hand  with  the  extraordinary  increase  of  the  upper  contribution  limit  for  social  security 
contributions, the limit of the yearly taxable family income to be eligible to the surcharge to the 
family allowance with three or more children was increased by 5.2% in 2005 (AK diverse volumes). 
 
Beside  these  small  changes,  the  main  family  benefits  (family  allowance,  child  tax  credit,  childcare 
benefit) were neither changed nor “indexed” in the period 2003 to 2005. In general, in Austria family 
benefits  are  not  indexed,  i.e.  do  not  rise  with  inflation  or  income  growth.  This  means  that  (without 
reforms) benefit amounts proportionally fall short of other incomes. 
 
5.2  Empirical findings 
5.2.1  Situation in 2003 
Table 14 shows the dimension of different population breakdowns (by gender, age and household type) 
and these groups’ average equivalised disposable household incomes per month in the year 2003. As in 
1998, persons living in single parent households (78% of total average income) and persons living in 
households  with  couples  with  three  children  or  more  (80%  of  total  average  income)  are  the poorest 
population groups under consideration. The group with the highest income are persons in non single 
households without children (111% of total average income). 
 
Children (below 18 years of age) still have a lower income than the population average, while the elderly 
(60 years and above) are slightly above the population average. Still there is a gap between the disposable 
household income of women (98% of total average) and men (102% of total average), however, the data 
suggests a smaller difference than in 1998. 
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Looking at income deciles, the total average income is exceeded in the 7
th decile. In the lowest decile the 










% of total 
average 
all  100.0%  1,641  100.0% 
decile 1  10.0%  725  44.2% 
decile 2  10.0%  973  59.3% 
decile 3  10.0%  1,140  69.5% 
decile 4  10.0%  1,276  77.8% 
decile 5  10.0%  1,417  86.4% 
decile 6  10.0%  1,573  95.9% 
decile 7  10.0%  1,735  105.7% 
decile 8  10.0%  1,940  118.2% 
decile 9  10.0%  2,250  137.2% 
decile 10  10.0%  3,381  206.1% 
hh type*: single  14.5%  1,574  95.9% 
hh type: single parent  3.9%  1,284  78.2% 
hh type: ma no child  34.9%  1,819  110.9% 
hh type: ma 1-2 children  37.5%  1,618  98.6% 
hh type: ma 3+ children  9.1%  1,313  80.0% 
age 0 – 17  20.4%  1,471  89.6% 
age 18 – 59  58.6%  1,694  103.3% 
age 60+  21.0%  1,657  101.0% 
female  51.4%  1,608  98.0% 
male  48.6%  1,675  102.1% 
* hh=household; ma = more (than one) adult; share of persons living in such a hh 
Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income 
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
 
5.2.2  Effects of changes from 2003 to 2005 on disposable income and poverty 
5.2.2.1  Change in disposable income 
On average the policy reforms between 2003 and 2005 result in a 0.4% increase of disposable household 
income (Figure 10). The figure does not show a clear pattern concerning progressivity. While there is 
nearly no change for the top and the bottom decile, the lower deciles gain slightly more than the higher 
deciles with the highest gains in decile 3 (plus 0.9%). This pattern is caused by the interaction of the 
                                                 
25 Differences in the income distribution between 1998 (Table 7) and 2003 (Table 14) do not only refer to real changes 
between the two years but also reflect the usage of different data sources. Accordingly it cannot be concluded that elderly 
people are better off in 2003 than in 1998 nor that the difference in male and female disposable household incomes has 
narrowed.   36 
reliefs by the tax reform 2004/05 and the non indexation of family benefits; the latter leads (isolated from 
other changes) to losses in real income (see below). 











all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 2003 
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
 
The reduction in disposable household income due to the non indexation of family benefits becomes 
more visible if the changes in disposable income are split with respect to different household types. 
Figure 11 illustrates that households without children (more person households: 0.6%; singles: 0.4%) 
gain on average more than household types with children. However, the differences are not very incisive. 
































































ma = more (than one) adult 
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
 
The same holds true for differences with respect to age groups: people of working age gain slightly more 
(plus 0.5%) than children (plus 0.3%) and the elderly (plus 0.4%) (Figure 12). This may be explained by   37 
the non indexation of family benefits on the one hand and the raise in health insurance contributions, 
which affects the elderly over proportionally, on the other. 
 





all 0 - 17 18 - 59 60+
 
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
 
5.2.2.2  Change in poverty 
Following the modest impact of the reforms on the income distribution, and taking into account the 
confidence interval (95%), the policy  changes  in the period under investigation had no influence on 
poverty rates in general. Also according to age and gender, poverty rates did not change significantly. If 
we look at different household types, some poverty reduction (more than one percentage point based on a 
“retained” poverty line) for single parents and couples with three and more children can be observed. 
Here, the extension of the single parent/ single earner tax credit including negative tax is decisive.   38 



















ma = more (than one) adult 
Poverty rate: share of people living in households with disposable income below the poverty line 
Poverty line: 60% of median equivalised disposable household income in 2003 
Statistical reliability of the estimates is shown using confidence intervals at the 5% level 
Source Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
5.2.3  Instruments driving changes 
Following the previous analysis it can be assumed that as regards changes in income distribution, the 
reliefs by the tax reform 2004/05 on the one hand, and the non indexation of family benefits from 2003 to 
2005 on the other hand, have a counteracting effect. In addition, for specific population groups specific 
policy changes (e.g. the extension of the single parent/ single earner tax credit for single parents and 
couples with three or more children or the increase of health insurance contributions for the elderly) seem 
to play a role. To assess the contribution of different groups of instruments to overall changes in more 
detail,  again  we  split  total  changes  in  disposable  income  into  changes  related  to  social  security 
contributions, income taxes and cash benefits. This analysis is accompanied by the analysis of the share 
of social security contributions, income taxes and cash benefits paid/received by each income quintile and 
the  respective  changes  from  2003  to  2005  and  the  assessment  of  the  redistributional  effect  of  each 
instrument group over time. 
 
5.2.3.1  Role of social security contributions, income taxes and cash benefits 
Figure 14 presents the  average  changes in disposable income per decile (as in Figure 10) related to 
different instrument groups (for a description of the method see 4.2.3.1). In total, increases in disposable 
income arise from tax reliefs (tax reform 2004/05). In contrast, decreased benefits – mainly due to the 
non indexation  of  family  benefits  –  and  increased  social  security  contributions,  i.e.  health  insurance   39 
contributions, decrease disposable income. However, on average the gains due to tax reliefs outweigh 
these losses. Thus, the tax reform 2004/05 noticeably strengthened household disposable income. 
 
However, in particular for the bottom decile, gains from paying less tax are equalised by losses in benefits 
and increases in social security contributions. This development is, on the one hand, due to the fact that 
the tax reform 2004/05 abstained from an increase in the general negative tax (only the income bracket 
with eligibility to the negative tax was extended). Thus, persons without or with very low incomes are 
hardly relieved by the tax reform (Breuss et al. 2004). On the other hand, children are more concentrated 
in the lower income deciles and income from family benefits builds quite an important part of the total 
income in these households, thus the non indexation of family benefits has a stronger impact on low 
incomes. 
 
For income deciles above the 2
nd decile – following the structure of the tax reform – the gains from the 
tax reform decrease continuously but also the losses due to the non indexation of family benefits. In terms 
of higher social security contributions, the higher income deciles are also affected by the extraordinary 
rise in the upper contribution limit. As a result, in the highest decile the increases of social security 
contributions almost make up for the gains due to the tax reform. 
 














Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 2003 
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
 
Looking at different household types, Figure 15 clearly states that especially households with children are 
affected by the lacking adaptation of family benefit amounts. Somewhat higher gains in tax reliefs – as 
some of them are especially targeted at families with children, like the additional amounts for children   40 
within the single earner / single parent tax credit – are substantially reduced by reductions in family 
benefits (in real income terms). 
 





















ma = more (than one) adult 
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
 
Analysing the changes in disposable household income according to age groups, it can be observed that 
gains due to the tax reform 2004/05 are more or less equally distributed among the age groups. The 
differences lie in the reductions of disposable income caused by the non indexation of family benefits and 
the increase in social security contributions. Clearly, children are most affected by the non indexation of 
family benefits. On the other hand, the elderly are strongly concerned by the increase in health insurance 
contributions,  as  pensioners  were  the  group  with  the  highest  increase  of  contributions  and  these 
contributions play quite an important role in relation to their total income (Figure 16). 
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Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
 
5.2.3.2  Share of instrument per income group 
Following  the  decomposition  of  the  changes  in  disposable  household  income  from  2003  to  2005 
according to the different tax benefit instruments, we analyse the development in the share of social 
security contributions, income taxes and cash benefits paid/received by each income quintile. In general, 
it again can be seen that lower income groups receive a higher share in total cash benefits than the share 
they have to pay of total social security contributions and total income taxes, whereas for higher income 
groups the opposite is true. 
 
In 2003, the bottom quintile paid 6% of all social security contributions and 2% of all income taxes and 
received 32% of all cash benefits. In contrast, 12% of all cash benefits went into the top quintile whereas 
it made up for 38% of all social security contributions and 59% of all income taxes. 
 
Looking at the development from 2003 to 2005, the distribution of social security contributions and cash 
benefits across the income quintiles saw practically no change. This can be explained by the fact that 
health  insurance  contributions  were  raised  for  all  population  groups  –  the  differences  are  related  to 
different occupational groups but not to income groups. In the case of benefits, some minor changes and 
the general non indexation of family benefits did not change the distribution across the income quintiles. 
 
On the income tax side, the tax reform 2004/05 led to small changes in the distribution across the income 
quintiles: the proportion of taxes paid by the top quintile (plus two percentage points) increased in favour 
of the lower four quintiles. This is due to the structure of the tax reform with the extension of the tax free   42 
zone on the one hand and the retention of the 50% marginal tax rate for high incomes on the other hand, 
leading to continuously decreasing gains from the tax reform for higher incomes. 
 





income taxes cash benefits 
quintile 1  6.2%  1.9%  31.6% 
quintile 2  12.7%  6.8%  22.1% 
quintile 3  18.3%  12.2%  18.6% 
quintile 4  24.7%  20.2%  15.4% 
quintile 5  38.1%  58.9%  12.2% 
total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Quintile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 2003 
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 





income taxes cash benefits 
quintile 1  6.3%  1.2%  31.7% 
quintile 2  12.7%  5.9%  22.1% 
quintile 3  18.2%  11.7%  18.5% 
quintile 4  24.6%  20.1%  15.4% 
quintile 5  38.1%  61.1%  12.3% 
total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Quintile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 2003 
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
 
5.2.3.3  Redistributional effect of social security contributions, income taxes and cash benefits 
The previous results concerning the distribution of the instrument groups across the income quintiles 
suggest that the progressivity of income taxes increased slightly whereas there was no change in the 
progressivity of social security contributions and cash benefits. To evaluate whether this first assessment 
can be approved, Table 17 and Table 18 show the standard measures for redistribution as described in 
Chapter 4.2.3.3 of the paper. 
 
The  Reynolds Smolensky   and  the  Kakwani  indexes  approve  the  insignificance  of  changes  in  social 
security  contributions  and  cash  benefits  concerning  redistribution.  The  indexes  also  confirm  that  the 
redistributive impact of income taxes increased with the tax reform 2004/05 but the rise is rather modest. 
Not surprisingly, the higher redistributional effect of the income taxes stems from the higher progressivity 
of the instrument (indicated by the Kakwani index) and not from the “importance” of the instrument, as 
tax rates were lowered. However, in terms of redistribution (under the assumption of full take up), cash 
benefits are still the most important instrument.   43 
 
Table 17: Redistributional effect of tax/benefit-instruments, 2003 








social insurance contributions  0.33663  0.34031  -0.00205  0.13511  -0.01313  0.00163 
std.error  0.00568  0.00563  0.00001  0.00064  0.00003  0.00004 
taxes  0.34031  0.29500  0.04717  0.17877  0.21670  0.00187 
std.error  0.00168  0.00155  0.00014  0.00098  0.00075  0.00002 
benefits  0.29500  0.23896  0.06354  0.11020  0.64015  0.00750 
std.error  0.00035  0.00012  0.00122  0.00180  0.00296  0.00075 
rate: size of instrument in percentage of base 
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
Table 18: Redistributional effect of tax/benefit-instruments, 2005 








social insurance contributions  0.33663  0.34030  -0.00218  0.13826  -0.01359  0.00149 
std.error  0.00621  0.00759  0.00138  0.00225  0.00873  0.00001 
taxes  0.34030  0.29203  0.05026  0.16919  0.24681  0.00199 
std.error  0.00217  0.00116  0.00098  0.00069  0.00359  0.00002 
benefits  0.29203  0.23801  0.06117  0.10618  0.63729  0.00716 
std.error  0.00171  0.00223  0.00124  0.00240  0.00001  0.00072 
rate: size of instrument in percentage of base 
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
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6  The impact of hypothetical policy measures 
6.1  Introduction 
Micro simulation  models  are  especially  useful  for  answering  “What if” questions  about  different 
approaches to policy reform as they offer distinct possibilities of modelling, so that simulated changes 
translate directly into changes of actual policy rules. For this purpose the advantage of micro simulation 
models is that the effects of reform measures both on disposable household income and its distribution 
and  on  the  potential  budgetary  consequences  for  the  state  (or  responsible  public  authorities)  can  be 
studied. 
 
We use this capability to assess the “over night” impact of two hypothetical policy reforms that could 
have an impact on low incomes and poverty. The choice of these reform scenarios is partly derived by 
proposals made in the current policy debate (reform 1: continuous introduction of employees’ social 
security contributions above the lower threshold for contributions) and partly induced by the results of 
our analysis of actual policy reforms (reform 2: indexation of family benefits). 
 
The simulations are based on the tax/benefit system in force in 2005. For this purpose, the incomes 
contained in the latest available micro data (EU SILC 2004 with incomes 2003) are up rated with specific 
up rating factors (depending on the type of income) to 2005. On the basis of this method the income 
distribution and the poverty rates in the “baseline scenario” are calculated. Then the reform scenarios are 
applied and analysed. For the reform scenarios we again use a “retained” poverty line, i.e. the same 
poverty line as in the baseline scenario. 
 
6.2  Reform  1:  continuous  introduction  of  employees’  social  security 
contributions above the lower threshold for contributions 
In  the  current  system  employees  start paying  the  full  rate  of  social  security  contributions  once  their 
monthly income exceeds the lower threshold for contributions which amounted to € 323.46 in 2005. 
Below this limit no compulsory insurance contributions have to be paid by employees, there is only the 
option for a voluntary health and pension insurance.
26 
                                                 
26 As the focus in this paper is on household disposable income, social security contributions by employers are again not 
included in the analysis.   45 
 
The proposal to switch to a continuous introduction instead of an abrupt introduction of social security 
contributions above the lower threshold for contributions is based on two concerns. On the one hand, in 
the area of low incomes negative incentives to take up, extend or to continue employment should be 
avoided. It is argued that the erratic progression in the low income sector caused by the current regulation 
is inequitable and counterproductive for effective incentives for work. On the other hand, there is also the 
argument that for employees who did not profit from the tax reform 2004/05 because of already tax free 
incomes some supportive measures to increase their net income have to be introduced. The decrease of 
social security contributions for employees with low incomes would be one example for measures leading 
in this direction. 
 
The concrete reform scenario introduces staggered social security contributions for employees with low 
income. The full contribution rate (18.0% white collar; 18.2% blue collar) is only reached at a monthly 
gross income of € 1000. Between € 323.46 and € 1000 the rate is increased continuously from zero to the 
full rate. 
 
On average, the reform would produce an increase in disposable household income by 0.3%. As the 
measure is targeted at low income groups, it has also some kind of redistributional effect. The gains are 
the highest in the bottom income decile (about 0.7%) and decrease continuously with rising income. In 
terms  of  household  types,  single  parents  would  profit  most  from  the  reform  (average  increase  of 
disposable income by 0.4%) as they seem to be most frequently engaged in the degree of employment 
concerned. Looking at age groups and gender, despite the fact that persons in pension age are certainly 
less affected by the measure, there are no relevant differences. 
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Table 19: Reform 1: Average percentage change in disposable income by population group 
all  0.29% 
decile 1  0.68% 
decile 2  0.55% 
decile 3  0.47% 
decile 4  0.51% 
decile 5  0.43% 
decile 6  0.35% 
decile 7  0.28% 
decile 8  0.20% 
decile 9  0.15% 
decile 10  0.06% 
hh type: single  0.09% 
hh type: single parent  0.43% 
hh type: ma no child  0.30% 
hh type: ma 1-2 children  0.36% 
hh type: ma 3+ children  0.29% 
age 0-17  0.35% 
age 18-59  0.35% 
age 60+  0.09% 
female  0.29% 
male  0.29% 
ma = more (than one) adult 
Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 2005 
Source Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
 
However, the (relatively small) increases in disposable income cannot produce any significant change in 
poverty rates. The calculations result in annual costs or decreased revenues for the state from employees’ 
social security contributions of € 294 million. Thus, the additional costs would manage to increase the 
disposable income of low income groups to some extent but not reduce the poverty rates. 
 
Table 20: Reform 1: Change in poverty rates by population group 
  base  reform 
total  11.1%  10.9% 
hh type: single  20.4%  20.0% 
hh type: single parent  21.4%  21.4% 
hh type: ma no child  8.8%  8.6% 
hh type: ma 1-2 children  7.3%  7.0% 
hh type: ma 3+ children  16.4%  16.4% 
age 0-17  11.4%  11.2% 
age 18-59  10.0%  9.7% 
age 60+  13.8%  13.8% 
female  12.5%  12.2% 
male  9.6%  9.4% 
ma = more (than one) adult 
Poverty rate: share of people living in households with disposable income below the poverty line 
Poverty line: 60% of median equivalised disposable household income in 2005 
Source Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 
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6.3  Reform 2: yearly indexation of family benefits 
Relating to the results of the analyses of the effects of policy changes in the period 2003 to 2005, the 
reform picks up the fact that family benefits are not “indexed” in Austria, i.e. do not rise with inflation or 
income growth. In general, given the high expenditure on family benefits in an international comparison 
and the significant increases in recent years, this seems not to be a dramatic problem. Nevertheless, since 
these last adaptations took place, the real income for families derived from family benefits decreased. 
The last amendment of the child tax credit goes back to the year 2000, the childcare benefit was not 
increased since its introduction in 2002. In the case of the family allowance, the age related amounts 
(surcharges for children above two years of age) were adapted in 2003, the surcharges depending on the 
number  of  children  in  2000  and  the  surcharge  for  families  with  more  than  two  children 
(“Mehrkindzuschlag”) in 2002. 
The reform scenario raises the mentioned family benefits from each last year of adaptation to the year 
2005 by the consumer price index. With this measure the disposable household income would rise on 
average by 0.4%. As children are more concentrated in the lower income deciles and the same absolute 
amounts of family benefits are higher in relation to low incomes, the reform would have some kind of 
redistributive impact.  In the lowest three deciles, the  gains would amount to about 0.9% and  would 
continuously decrease in the higher deciles. Relating to the household type, couples with three and more 
children (plus 1.4%) as well as single parents (plus 1%) would benefit most from the indexation. 
Table 21: Average percentage change in disposable income by population group, reform 2 
all  0.39% 
decile 1  0.85% 
decile 2  0.87% 
decile 3  0.88% 
decile 4  0.69% 
decile 5  0.48% 
decile 6  0.39% 
decile 7  0.36% 
decile 8  0.24% 
decile 9  0.18% 
decile 10  0.09% 
hh type: single  0.00% 
hh type: single parent  1.00% 
hh type: ma no child  0.00% 
hh type: ma 1-2 children  0.67% 
hh type: ma 3+ children  1.37% 
age 0–17  0.96% 
age 18–59  0.34% 
age 60+  0.04% 
female  0.40% 
male  0.39% 
ma = more (than one) adult 
Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 2005 
Source Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004   48 
In contrast to reform 1, the benefit indexation would be able to reduce poverty rates for households with 
children. Especially single parents – a group substantially at risk of poverty – and certainly children 
themselves would benefit from the reform. The calculations result in annual costs or higher expenditure 
on family benefits of € 341 million. Thus, not taking into  consideration important factors like work 
incentives and solely concentrating on combating poverty, with only a slightly higher budget than for 
reform 1, the effect on poverty rates is more pronounced. 
Table 22: Change in poverty rates, different groups, reform 2 
  base  reform 
total  11.1%  10.5% 
hh type: single  20.4%  20.4% 
hh type: single parent  21.4%  18.6% 
hh type: ma no child  8.8%  8.6% 
hh type: ma 1-2 children  7.3%  6.4% 
hh type: ma 3+ children  16.4%  15.2% 
age 0–17  11.4%  10.1% 
age: 18–59  10.0%  9.5% 
age: 60+  13.8%  13.8% 
female  12.5%  11.8% 
male  9.6%  9.2% 
ma = more (than one) adult 
Poverty rate: share of people living in households with disposable income below the poverty line 
Poverty line: 60% of median equivalised disposable household income in 2005 
Source Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004   49 
7  Summary and conclusions 
The aim of the presented analysis is to evaluate whether policy reforms in Austria between 1998 and 2005 
were successful in meeting redistributive objectives and in reducing poverty. In addition, the outcomes of 
two  hypothetical policy  reforms,  one  targeting  employees  with  low  incomes,  the  other  families  with 
children,  were  assessed.  The  main  findings  based  on  the  tax/benefit  micro simulation  model 
EUROMOD
27 relating to equivalised disposable household income are: 
 
Changes in the Austrian tax/benefit system from 1998 to 2003 (primarily the increase of family benefits 
with the “family package” 1999/2000, the tax reform 2000 and the introduction of the childcare benefit in 
2002)  led  in  total  to  a  significant  increase  in  disposable  household  income  (on  average  1.1%).  The 
changes were clearly progressive meaning that gains in disposable income were the higher the lower the 
income, only the top income groups faced (moderate) losses. The progressive nature is also illustrated by 
decreasing overall poverty rates. (This observation is based on the concept of the analysis, i.e. using a 




A second characteristic of changes in the period 1998 to 2003 is their family friendliness. While all 
household  types  without  children  saw  on  average  a  slight  decrease  in  their  disposable  income,  all 
household types with children gained. The “big winners” were those groups who are most at risk of 
poverty and have the lowest disposable income (around 80% of the total average): couples with three or 
more children and single parents. In the same sense, poverty reduction concentrated on households with 
children and the reforms clearly succeeded in reducing child poverty. The poverty rate for couples with 
three  children  and  more  decreased  substantially.  The  situation  improved  on  average  also  for  single 
parents, although their poverty rate remained far above the overall poverty rate. In contrast there was near 
to no change in poverty rates for groups without children. 
 
While the other age groups experienced an increase in disposable income and a decrease in their poverty 
rates, the situation for people aged 60 years and more remained more or less the same. Thus, the already 
considerable difference between the overall poverty rate and the poverty rate for elderly people increased. 
 
                                                 
27 As input datasets we use ECHP 1999 and EU SILC 2004. 
28 Note that this observation is based on the concept of the analysis, i.e. using a “retained” poverty line as well as up rating and 
devaluating incomes for comparison purposes by the consumer price index (see Chapter 2.3).   50 
Concerning the question which instruments were the driving forces, higher cash benefits accounted for 
almost all the increases in disposable income. Tax reliefs targeted at (low income) families with children 
(increases in the single earner/ single parent tax credit including negative tax) had some impact on poorer 
people’s income, especially for single parents. However, for the general public of tax payers, decreases in 
taxes (due to the tax reform 2000) were more than compensated by the following reduction of tax credits 
(wage earner tax credit, pensioners’ tax credit) and by fiscal drag. Especially the elderly were affected by 
the reduction of tax credits – in conjunction with the relatively low indexation of the pension top up this 
explains their stagnant position in terms of disposable income mentioned above. Changes due to social 
security contributions can almost be neglected. 
 
In sum, the effect of increases in benefits outnumbers the effect of a de facto increase in income taxes by 
far, this explains the average rise in the disposable income of the households. If we look at the lion’s 
share of an increase in benefits, almost all of the increase is due to an increase in family related benefits: 
Both the increase of the family allowance and the child tax credit as well as the introduction of the child 
care benefit played an important part. The redistributive impact of these per se universal benefits, which 
also benefit high income groups, stems from the fact that on the one hand, the same absolute amounts 
play a significantly larger relative role related to the income of low income groups, and that on the other 
hand children are more concentrated in lower income groups. 
 
Changes  in  the  Austrian  tax/benefit  system  from  2003  to  2005  (mainly  the  tax  reform  2004/5  and 
increases in the health insurance contributions since 2004) led in sum to an average gain of 0.4% in 
disposable household income. In general, the measures had no significant impact on income distribution 
and poverty: While there was nearly no change in disposable income for the top and the bottom decile, 
the lower deciles gained slightly more than the higher deciles. 
 
On average households without children profited more than households with children. However, some 
poverty reduction for single parents and couples with three and more children can be observed. With 
respect to age groups, people in working age gained slightly more than children and the elderly. 
 
If we look at the instruments driving the changes, we find that all population groups benefited from the 
tax reform 2004/05. However, as the tax reform abstained from an increase in the (general) negative tax, 
the  gains  are  relatively  low  in  the bottom  decile but  the  highest  in  the  2
nd  decile,  from  where  they 
decrease continuously with rising income. A noteworthy finding is that increases in disposable income 
arising  from  the  tax  reform  were  to  a  certain  extent  lowered by  losses  in benefits  (in  terms  of  real 
income). These losses are due to the fact that in Austria family benefits are not “indexed”, i.e. do not rise 
with  inflation  or  income  growth,  thus,  as  a  result  benefit  amounts  proportionally  fall  short  of  other   51 
incomes. Especially households with children were affected and thus over proportionally lower income 
groups, as children are more concentrated in low income households and especially for single parents and 
for  couples  with  three  or  more  children  state  transfers,  in  particular  family  benefits,  make  up  for  a 
relatively high share in total income.
29 However, the extension of the single parent/ single earner tax 
credit within the tax reform 2004/05 (including negative tax for families with children) supported those 
vulnerable groups. The elderly were mostly affected by the increase of health insurance contributions, as 
pensioners were the group with the highest increase of contributions and these contributions play quite an 
important role in relation to their income. 
 
In  total,  the  preponderance  of  gains  from  the  tax  reform  led  to  an  increase  in  disposable  income. 
However, as mentioned above, for the bottom decile the gains were fully compensated mainly due to 
losses (in terms of real incomes) caused by the non indexation of family benefits and for the top decile 
due to higher social security contributions related to an extraordinary increase of the upper contribution 
limit. 
 
Another important part of the analysis related to the share of instruments (social security contributions, 
income  taxes,  cash  benefits)  paid/  received  per  income  group  and  the  redistributional  effect  of  the 
instruments over time.
30 In general, the upper contribution limit of social security contributions and the 
progressive scale of income tax lead to the fact that income tax is much more concentrated on higher 
income groups than social security contributions. Also cash benefits – despite the high share of social 
insurance related and universal benefits – favour people with less income. Concerning social insurance 
related benefits this at the first glance surprising diagnosis stems from the fact that the probability of 
becoming unemployed or sick is higher in lower income classes. In the case of universal family benefits, 
the vertical redistributive impact is caused by the distribution over the life cycle (high benefit intensity 
around birth, children are more concentrated in lower income groups) (Guger 1996; Guger 1998; Guger 
2005). 
 
In 2005, the bottom quintile paid 6% of all social security contributions and 1% of all income taxes and 
received 32% of all cash benefits. On the other side, the highest quintile brought up 38% of all social 
security  contributions  and  61%  of  all  income  taxes  and  benefited  from  12%  of  all  cash  benefits. 
Disregarding artificial changes due to the usage of different underlying datasets (ECHP 1999 and EU 
SILC 2004), two developments can be observed in the period 1998 to 2005: Between 1998 and 2003, due 
                                                 
29 However, this has to be put into the context that in Austria the promotion of families with cash benefits was significantly 
increased until 2003 and is quite generous in an international comparison. 
30 The analysis is based on the assumption of full take up of benefits, in particular social assistance benefits. Pensions, with the 
exception of pension top up, are counted as original income (see Chapters 2.1 and 2.3).   52 
to  the  extension  of  family  benefits,  the  proportion  of  benefits  received  by  the  higher  two  quintiles 
decreased in favour of the lower three quintiles by about 1.5 percentage points. In the period 2003 to 
2005,  the  tax  reform  2004/05  increased  the  proportion  of  taxes  paid  by  the  top  quintile  (plus  two 
percentage points) in favour of the lower four quintiles. Thus, no substantial changes in the distribution of 
the instruments can be assessed, but the changes indicate also a redistributive impact. 
 
To refine the assessment of the distributional effects of the instrument groups, we use a range of standard 
measures  on  income  inequality  (e.g.  the  Reynolds Smolensky  Index  of  Redistribution  based  on  the 
difference between income inequality before and after applying an instrument). Cash benefits have the 
highest redistributive impact of the three instruments. In the period of the extension of family benefits 
(1998  to  2003)  the  Reynolds Smolensky  Index  for  cash  benefits  slightly  increased.  Moreover,  the 
redistributive impact of income taxes was slightly raised in the line of the tax reform 2004/05. Social 
security contributions – due to the upper contribution limit – have even a slight regressive impact and 
showed no changes in the periods of investigation. In sum, the redistributive impact from high to low 
income classes reaches a considerable amount. Measured by equivalised household income, the Gini for 
original gross income stands at 0.34 in comparison to 0.24 for net disposable income. 
 
Concluding,  our  analysis  indicates  that  tax/benefit  reforms  between  1998  and  2003  were  clearly 
successful  in  reducing  income  inequality  and  combating  poverty,  especially  among  families  with 
children, while reforms in the period 2003 to 2005 – despite producing an average increase of disposable 
income – had no strong impact on income distribution and poverty. Noteworthy the reforms were not 
budget neutral but implemented at the cost of a higher budget deficit. This holds true especially for the 
increases of family benefits whereas the effect of the tax reform 2004/05 will be compensated after 2005 
by fiscal drag. Our investigation also indicates that not all population groups at risk of poverty gained 
from recent reforms. For example, the measures had practically no impact on the situation of elderly 
people.  Moreover,  vulnerable  groups  that  clearly  benefited  from  the  reforms  like  single  parents  and 
couples with three and more children still face a comparatively high poverty rate. That means that there is 
still a necessity to put combating poverty and social exclusion at the centre of political efforts. 
 
Thus, we use the capability of EUROMOD to assess the impact of two hypothetical reforms that could 
have an impact on low incomes and poverty. Following recent policy discussions, in reform scenario 1 we 
simulate  a  continuous  introduction  of  social  security  contributions  for  employees  above  the  lower 
threshold  for  contributions  up  to  a  monthly  gross  income  of  €  1,000  (instead  of  the  current  abrupt 
introduction).
31 On average, the reform would produce an increase in disposable household income by 
                                                 
31 As the focus of this paper is on disposable household income, we do not analyse possible reductions on contributions paid by 
employers.   53 
0.3%. As the measure is targeted at lower income groups, the gains would be the highest in the bottom 
income decile and decrease continuously with rising income. However, the (relatively small) increases in 
disposable income cannot produce any significant change in poverty rates. The costs of the reform would 
amount to about € 300 million annually. 
 
Relating to the results of the analyses of the effects of policy changes in the period 2003 to 2005, the 2
nd 
reform scenario picks up the fact that family benefits are not yearly indexed in Austria. Thus we simulate 
a rise of family benefits by the consumer price index from each last year of adaptation to the year 2005. 
With this measure the disposable income would rise on average by 0.4%. In the lowest three deciles, the 
gains would amount to about 0.9% and would continuously decrease in the higher deciles. In addition, the 
family benefit indexation would be able to reduce poverty rates for households with children, especially 
single parents would benefit from the reform. The measure would result in costs of about € 350 million 
annually. However, it has to be kept in mind that (even without this possible reform) expenses on family 
benefits are already quite high in an international comparison.   54 
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Appendix 1: Measures of redistribution 
The measures of income redistribution and progressivity used in this study are based on a family of 
indices based on the single parameter Gini (or S Gini) (Donaldson and Weymark, 1980; Yitzhaki, 1983). 
The redistributive effect, Π
RE, of taxes and/or benefits is measured as the difference between the Gini 
coefficients of income before and after taxes and/or benefits. This difference can be decomposed into 
vertical  equity  and  re-ranking.  Vertical  equity  is  measured  by  the  Reynolds Smolensky  index,  Π
RS, 
(Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977) which is defined as the difference between the Gini coefficient for 
income before taxes and/or benefits and the concentration index
32 of income after taxes and/or benefits. 
Re ranking  is  measured  by  the  re ranking  index,  D,  which  is  defined  as  the  difference  between  the 
generalised Gini coefficient for income after taxes and/or benefits and the generalised concentration index 
of income after taxes and/or benefits. 
 
  TB X X
RE
TB G G + − = Π    
    D
RS
TB − Π =  
    [ ] [ ] TB X TB X TB X X C G C G + + + − − − =  
(1) 
 
Progressivity  is  measured  using  the  Kakwani  index  Π
K  (see  Kakwani  1977).  This  is  defined  as  the 
difference between the generalised concentration index of taxes and the generalised Gini coefficient for 
income before taxes. 
 
  X T
K
T G C − = Π   (2) 
 
























where t is the average tax rate and b the average benefit rate. 
                                                 
32 The concentration index is the Gini index for the concentration curve.   57 
Appendix 2: Total change in disposable income 1998-2003 
The  table  below  compares  disposable  income  and  its  components  in  1998  and  2003  based  on  two 
different datasets: For 1998 the 5th wave of the ECHP and for 2003 the EU SILC 2004 (containing 
income data for 2003) is used. 2003 incomes are devaluated to 1998 prices using the consumer price 
index  for  comparison  purposes.  The  table  reports  a  change  of  disposable  income  of  6.7%,  whereof 
however 6.4% are changes in original income. Thus, it is obviously impossible to evaluate to which 
extent the changes in taxes and social insurance contributions are due to reforms in these policies, due to 
socio economic changes in terms of employment rate, unemployment rate and number of pensioners, etc. 
and  which  are  due  to  the  different  databases  themselves  (different  sample,  interviewer  effects,  etc.). 
Furthermore, the lack of panel data for the two years, for example, makes the comparison of income by 
household type virtually unusable. 
 
Total change in average disposable income 1998-2003* 







benefits  taxes  soc. sec. 
contrib. 
all  6.7%  6.4%  2.9%  -1.6%  -0.9% 
decile 1  6.8%  0.3%  6.7%  0.1%  -0.3% 
decile 2  6.0%  -1.2%  6.0%  0.8%  0.4% 
decile 3  6.8%  5.8%  1.8%  0.0%  -0.8% 
decile 4  7.3%  6.7%  3.0%  -0.1%  -2.3% 
decile 5  7.7%  2.1%  4.7%  0.5%  0.4% 
decile 6  6.9%  4.7%  4.4%  -0.8%  -1.4% 
decile 7  5.9%  3.6%  4.3%  -0.7%  -1.3% 
decile 8  5.2%  5.0%  0.8%  -0.4%  0.0% 
decile 9  4.5%  5.4%  1.7%  -1.7%  -0.9% 
decile 10  8.9%  15.5%  1.3%  -6.5%  -1.5% 
hh type**: single  7.9%  15.4%  0.0%  -6.5%  -1.0% 
hh type: single parent  4.8%  3.4%  5.4%  -2.5%  -1.5% 
hh type: ma no child  2.6%  4.6%  -0.1%  -0.6%  -1.3% 
hh type: ma 1-2 children  9.9%  5.8%  6.1%  -1.1%  -0.9% 
hh type: ma 3+ children  9.7%  1.4%  9.1%  -0.6%  -0.3% 
age 0–17  10.3%  4.7%  7.9%  -1.6%  -0.8% 
age 18–59  3.6%  1.6%  2.8%  -0.2%  -0.6% 
age 60+  12.2%  21.1%  -1.3%  -6.0%  -1.7% 
* using 5
th wave of ECHP for 1998 and EU-SILC 2004 for 2003 
** hh=household; ma = more (than one) adult 
Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in the respective year 
Source: Euromod 
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Appendix 3: Changes not covered by the analysis 
The changes that are not covered by our analysis can be divided into three groups. The first group relates 
to the fact that not only the disposable income (after social security contributions, income taxes and cash 
benefits) plays a role in terms of income distribution and poverty but also expenditures that have to be 
met by the households. In the period 1998 to 2003, the following changes concerning expenditures can be 
mentioned: 
   Miscellaneous increases in taxes and fees, e.g. for motor vehicles, electricity, tobacco, driving licence, 
passport, etc.; 
   in  the  health care  system,  out of pocket payments  (for  prescriptions,  medical  aids,  etc.)  were 
increased, both categories put a burden especially on recipients of low incomes; 
   the  contribution free  health coinsurance  was  abolished  for  certain  relatives,  the  additional 
contribution rate for these relatives amounts to 3.4%
33; 
   introduction of tuition fees for students, etc. 
 
Between 2003 and 2005, among others the following changes concerning expenditures took place: 
   Increases  in  several  taxes,  e.g.  mineral  oil  and  tobacco  tax,  but  on  the  other  hand  decreases  of 
consumption taxes in the course of the tax reform 2004/05; 
   In the health care system, out of pocket payments (for prescriptions, medical aids, spectacles, etc.) 
were increased, which put a burden especially on recipients of low incomes. 
 
The second group of changes not covered by the analysis relates to changes in benefits that cannot be 
simulated (due to the lack of information on the insurance and work history in the data) but are taken 
directly from the data using up rating factors. As most important measure of this kind, the modified 
calculation method for the unemployment benefit in 2001 (uniform net replacement ratio instead of the 
calculation by wage classes, reduction of family supplements, increase of the replacement ratio in the case 
of low benefits) is not taken into account for the analysis of changes between 1998 and 2003. After the 
reform, in general unemployed persons with children receive lower benefits, unemployed persons on low 
benefits without children receive higher benefits than before (AK diverse volumes). 
 
Although  we  concentrate  explicitly  on  the  “day  after”  effect  of  policy  changes,  for  a  complete 
information we also list a third group of changes not covered by the analysis which refers to changes in 
                                                 
33 There is no information in the survey data on circumstances which are determining whether the additional contribution rate 
has to be paid or not.   59 
the socio economic environment; substantially to changes in the employment rate, in the unemployment 
rate, in the number of pensioners and in the level of gross incomes in the periods under investigation: 
   The  average  number  of  employed  persons  (employees  and  self employed)  increased  from  3.446 
million in 1998 to 3.560 million in 2003 and reached a new peak in 2005 with 3.619 million (AK 
2006, 136; Statistik Austria 2006c, 198). The increase is mainly due to employees working part time. 
There  were  also  specific  changes  in  the  employment patterns  of  certain  groups,  for  example  the 
introduction of the childcare benefit led to a deferral of the (re)entry of mothers into the labour market 
(Lutz 2003; Riesenfelder et al. 2006). 
   Compared to 7.2% in 1998, the (national) unemployment rate stood at 7.0% in 2003 and reached 
again 7.2% in 2005 (AK diverse volumes). 
   The total number of pensioners increased from 1.995 million in 1998 to 2.105 million in 2003 and 
reached also a new peak in 2005 with 2.143 million (Statistik Austria 2001; Statistik Austria 2006; 
Statistik Austria 2007 HV SV diverse volumes). 
   In terms of incomes from pensions, we do not take into account structural effects (higher pensions for 
new pensioners than for outflows). In terms of individual gross employment incomes, the situation 
since 1998 was influenced by the extension of part time work. Thus, the differences between low and 
high individual employment incomes increased both from 1998 to 2003 and from 2003 to 2005, the 
real median income of employees even decreased. However, gross earnings per head increased in 
each period under investigation. Thus, on the level of households gross income increased as more 
persons per household received an income, on the household level there was also no trend towards 
higher income inequality (Rechnungshof 2004; Rechnungshof 2006; Statistik Austria 2007). 